"Team Syria" get a boost from Spin-Doctor

Or in other words: بدو يكحلها آم عماها

I felt dismayed reading Camille Otrakji's interview on the Lebanese Political Blog, Qifa Nabki. Camille has long been known amongst Syrian bloggers, analysts and political commentators for his efforts in promoting dialogue about Syria. I've criticised him severely before about projects of his, such as Onemideast.org, and have also had the opportunity to present my views on his own websites - often to much controversy from visitors.

Yet that does not mean I ever intend to spare him from scathing criticism when it is due, for the same freedom which allows him to defend the inexcusable actions of the Syrian regime are also those which will allow me to highlight some of the fallacies he made in the interview. Far from being a 'lone voice in the wilderness' he risks being dismissed as just another regime apologist who uses a cloak of respectability to make benevolent dictatorship appear legitimate.

Camille is a sophisticated and urbane individual, highly literate and intelligent. Therefore whenever I view his articles, comments or discussions I know that there is a structure underlying his argument, and a deliberate statement he intends to deliver, that give his position coherence and force. But that does not mean that what he says is right, merely that it is logically valid. Whether the string of logically valid arguments he gives are consistent is another matter, and I think that this is where he has failed miserably. This is not an exhaustive critique of all he said, but simply a highlight on some of the more interesting things that he mentioned.

Firstly he uses statistics which are based on facts that he does not make known. Statistics hold an unusually powerful sway over readers because numbers are generally thought to never lie. They are facts, simple and clear. Yet statistics can be notoriously easy to falsify, and even mislead. Anybody who has read the now famous book, "How To Lie With Statistics" knows how easy it is to say that anything can be true. One commentator on the blog draws an interesting parallel to Camille's argument and points out that the same holds true in Egypt, and Egypt had a successful revolution with the same statistical figures. Unfortunately Camille does himself no favours by using such a weak argument and appears to not know the popular adage, "72.5% of all statistics are made up on the spot".

Underlying Theme

The underlying message that Camille want's to deliver is as follows: that not all Syrians approve of the revolt; that the grievances are legitimate; that the government is honest about its intentions to reform; and that there are foreign elements, from billionaire Syrian business men such as Khaddam and Ribal al Assad, Bandar bin Sultan, and Saad Hariri, who are all bent on exploiting the legitimate grievances of the people to destroy Syria's regional position as a key geopolitical player.

This narrative is the standard one being delivered by Syrian state media and has been constantly drummed into the population's minds. Apparently no foreign media are considered impartial enough to be given the privilege of reporting directly from Syria, and grainy mobile phone footage is dismissed as part of an elaborate hoax. Camille even gives an amusing example of what he thinks can be achieved by someone with enough tech-savvy to edit videos and sound. Frankly I don't buy any of what he said and most people in the world don't either. The onus is on him, and the Syrian government, to allow enough transparency for the world and, more importantly, the Syrian people to decide what is really happening.

My response

The crisis of legitimacy that the Syrian regime faces is largely of its own doing, and there is no reason why they should be given the benefit of the doubt. The crisis has been mis-handled from the start and instead of providing transparency and paying attention to what even the president of the country says were legitimate grievances, the Syrian regime decided to play the conspiracy card. All foreign journalists were banned from reporting and one al Jazeera journalist with American, Canadian and Iranian nationality is still missing after landing in Damascus Airport over four days ago.

Then there is the issue that the Syrian government is trying to show that it has always intended for these reforms to take place. That somehow this popular pressure is not the reason it has decided to pursue this course of action. This is shameful and ludicrous, and the fact that Camille wishes to give the regime 'a chance' till 'the next election' beggars belief that the government can be trusted at all. In fact, he would do well to note that the protests accomplished in four weeks what 40 (or 11 depending on when you think reforms began) years could not. It is also interesting to note that the Syrian government behaves as if relenting to pressure from the Syrian people is a sign of weakness and shame, rather than something to be proud of. The gulf between the rulers and the ruled is thus clearly defined.

There is the issue of the extreme violence that faces anybody wishing to protest. Unarmed, innocent protestors are being arrested, shot at, beaten and harrassed. The fact that the government considers their demonstrations to be 'illegitimate' is not acceptable. Using the bogey man of salafi inspired armed groups is also unacceptable. If it were true then why are the security people shooting unarmed protestors and not shooting bearded fanatics with explosive belts and machine guns? But this is a question that should not even be debated, so clearly fallacious, and so popular has it been, with other dictatorships that have fallen, or are about to fall, in the region that it can be given no credence whatsoever.

Next we are given an outrageous statement comparing Syria's Alawites to the Jews of Israel or the Kurds and Kurdistan. That somehow Syria is the only country in the world where they can have a say in their own affairs. Well, Camille, you do need to make your mind up whether Syria is an Alawite state or a secular state. Or is it a secular state that happens to be Alawite, regardless of the fact that Alawites are a minority there? Or do you not realise that most Alawite's are not actually in the regime and have suffered just as much from the regime's corruption and repression as the rest of the population. Or do you not realise that you are giving legitimacy to the illegal settlement of Palestinian lands by using such an argument, and in so doing you undermine the entire supposed raison d'être of the Syrian regime. Or is it alright to use this argument for some people and not for others? Why has this statement been made and what do you mean by it?

At one point, Camille asks "What are you talking about when you say 'the Syrian regime'?" That is a very good question, and one which he himself needs to ponder over especially considering the question I raised above. At this point I thought he would give an interesting answer, but what follows next is a long rambling history lesson on the geo-politics of the region. We are told that democracy cannot happen the way we want it to in Syria, and we are given a convoluted and irrelevant argument using examples from Lebanon and Iraq. 

Camille, in essence, appears to me to be saying that in the Middle East, we cannot have democracy as is commonly understood; That the region has unique challenges and problems and only Syria is capable of pulling off the steady development curve needed. What Camille neglects to say is that Syria has a large hand in the lack of stability in both Lebanon and Iraq. I have written numerous articles highlighting Syria's formidable and highly successfuly foreign policy, but I won't sit back and allow him to ignore what he knows very well to be true, that Syria is itself a factor in the destabilisation of those governments. Of course that doesn't mean I oppose the intervention - for we live in a 'rough neighbourhood' - and in Iraq the government was imposed by an American occupation whilst in Lebanon it was a Western backed government which was quite happy to see Israel destroy half of Lebanon in order to eliminate the Lebanese resistance.

The argument that democracy cannot work in the case of Syria does not gel. What we have are Syrians of all sects and ethnicities asking for a bit of dignity and respect, they didn't even ask for 'one man-one vote democracy' but for freedom. The initial slogans people called out were that "The Syrian people cannot be humiliated". This freedom is freedom from arbitrary laws, police brutality, torture and the freedom to say what is on your mind without fear of arrest or harrassment. Besides, the finer points of democratic elections are not the focus of the discussion and we all know that most democracies now have elaborate systems that go beyond one man, one vote elections. Camille is here, and in fact throughout the entire interview, creating an artificial argument, and does not go towards addressing the real issues that have angered Syrians enough for them to go out onto the streets and risk death. He just wants them to stop demonstrating, to believe a regime that is killing them when it says that it will give up power to the people willingly, and that it will reform itself out of existence - Because this is what these reforms actually mean, whether they take effect in 5, 10 or 20 years.

Conclusion

Camille concludes that only Syria, or those who rule it, are capable of understanding the challenges of the region, otherwise we would all risk instability. But this is precisely the argument that Bin Ali, Mubarak and Gaddafi have used to convince the West that they can keep their people in check. But perhaps that is a bit of a Freudian slip? There has been nothing more catastrophic in recent Arab history than the repression of the people of the Middle East at the hands of their own rulers. Even Arafat was, in the end, kept in power by the Israelis to keep his people on a tight leash and not because he had their best interests at heart. Is this the kind of Middle East that Camille believes we should preserve? It seems that the Arab people (in all their sects, ethnicities and religions) have already answered that question: الشعب يريد اسقاط النظام

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A Response to Creative Syria's Author

Creative Syria has been relaunched with a fresh new look and an emphasis on the many crises that Syria is currently facing. Whilst the presentation of the site is excellent, the politics that are behind it will cause some consternation by Syrians who support the revolution. I do not intend to argue my own position in this post, instead I wish to critically examine the latest post, "Ten Reasons Why Many Syrians Are Not Interested Yet", and see whether his opposition to the Syrian revolution is justified or not. He enumerates these reasons first and then expands on his arguments. Naturally, I will begin by examining each point and then dissecting the rest of his argument. Like Camille, I will also backup my arguments, and examine whether the sources he cites are justified or not, and whether they support his argument.

1. The first argument is that there are no true democracies. Citing the Economist Intelligence Unit's democracy index, the idea that even the Arab world's better examples are all "flawed democracies" seems to be enough of a reason that Syrians are not interested, but in what, that is not yet mentioned. Are Syrians not interested in democracy because there are no truly democratic Arab countries? Or perhaps they are not interested in the "revolution" because even those Arab countries that are said to be nominally democratic (like Iraq or Lebanon) are a mess? Regardless of what is intended by this thesis, it is clear from that same index that countries such as Lebanon (scoring 5.32) and Iraq (scoring 4.03), are still higher than Syria, which scored a paltry 1.99

This score is derived from several factors according to the Wikipedia article quoted: Whether elections are free and fair; the security of voters; the influence of foreign powers on government; the capability of civil servants to implement policies. The Democracy index then places Syria firmly in the "Authoritarian Regime" category.

It is interesting that the author of the Creative Syria piece does not see the widespread protests that have paralysed the country for almost a year as enough evidence that Syrians are in actual fact very interested regardless of the flawed examples of Arabic democracies cited. The unprecedented level of presidential "reforms" in the past year alone, concerning everything from national health insurance companies to offering additional points to students at technical colleges, is a sign that the government is very interested in the revolutions that are sweeping the Arab world. Perhaps those many Syrians that Camille is referring to should be interested in democracy regardless whether they think Iraq and Lebanon are flawed democracies.

2. Camille states that in 2010 Lebanon and Iraq were perceived to be more corrupt than Syria. That statement is simply not true. In 2010, Transparency International rated the Worldwide Corruption Perception of Syria and Lebanon as an equally atrocious 2.5 for each, whereas Iraq was rated with a marginally higher score of 1.5. You can see the scores here.

3. A problematic description of "formerly proud" Arab countries is used for countries that have underwent the drastic changes that Camille believes "many Syrians" are not interested in. I'm not quite sure how he gauges whether or not a country used to be "proud". Iraq is described as a formerly leading Arab state, but I'm not sure how proud Iraqis felt of losing an entire generation (estimated at 300,000) in a war of aggression against Iran. Nor can we be sure how proud Libyans were before the overthrow of Gaddafi for us to snidely criticise Qatar's assistance of the Libyan rebels and their NTC. Were they more or less proud when Gaddafi gave up his weapons programmes for inspection to the West, and agreed upon massive oil concessions to BP, whilst hugging Tony Blair during the infamous "deal in the desert" saga. Most tellingly, Camille admits that the political process in Iraq, in spite of that country's occupation by the United States, could not proceed without consultations with Syria and Iraq. Obviously, and this is something conveniently ignored, this was because both Iran and Syria turned Iraq into their battlefield with the United States, which was the real reason for the atrocious levels of deaths amongst Iraqi civilians - apart from the American invasion and occupation. I'm not quite sure how valid an argument is when it depends on the "pride" of a nation. Especially in countries with such little transparency or scope for expressing genuine political opinion.

4. Yemen and Sudan are cited as examples of states that could be divided, and because three is a lucky number, I think Camille added Somalia - a curious and quite arbitrary addition. Yemen and Sudan, the most corrupt of Arab states, have been ruled by despots who will be judged by history to have been instrumental in dividing their states. The curious reversal of Omar Bashir's opposition to the division of his country, and the stupidity of Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had to despatch a team to Libya to ask Gaddafi how to react to a revolution (the latter told him to start shooting, and Saleh's forces promptly began firing at the crowds after an initial period of peaceful protest). Both of these countries are staunch allies of the Syrian regime, though the Syrian regime knows how brutally corrupt Saleh's regime is, when a team sent by Rami Makhlouf (the Syrian president's cousin) to negotiate a confidential deal in Yemen had to be flown out in secrecy in the dead of night when they were going to be forced to sign on Saleh's terms. But what are such little niggles between friends, eh? These countries are risking being dismantled because of the incompetence of their rulers, so citing them as an example is slightly misleading, if not wilfully inaccurate.

5. We are told that women's rights deteriorate after changes that allow Islamists a powerful role in the new state. That's quite an interesting play on words when you think about it. These "changes" Camille refers to are revolutions which removed despots and families that had been in power for decades. It assumes that women's rights were better prior to the revolution, whereas it is known that sexual harassment in Egypt reached epidemic proportions during Mubarak's reign; Gaddafi's vulgar use of virgin women "nuns of the revolution" and his importing of Italian women for his bunga bunga parties was on a par with Gulf potentates' excess. Why is the case of Tawakul Karman and many other women in Yemen - perceived as a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism - not cited as an example? Why, when ever Egyptian on the street in Tahrir square knows the revolution there is not over until the ruling military council, which is a continuation of Mubarak's rule, is removed? Again, a skilful omission of such nuances gives us the picture that the Islamic bogeyman will wreak havoc with women's rights in a region which already had a dismal record of women's rights even under the supposedly secular dictatorships which have dominated them for decades. Furthermore, no mention is made of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a staunch ally of Syria and a country not without its own thriving pro-democracy movement, yet with a dismal respect for women's rights. To capitalise on the plight of women in the Arab world and try to score cheap political points by claiming that it is a problem exclusively caused by political Islam - which is not true - is an ugly way that deflects from the real problems that women face in Arabic society.

6. The theme of the Islamic bogey man is continued in point six, where the issues of minorities is now discussed. Could somebody please explain to me where the Jewish minorities of Syria are? Or how the security situation in Iraq was deliberately undermined by both Iran and Syria to fight the Americans there by sending Islamists across the border? Another story from 2005 shows how the Syrian regime turned a blind eye to men who went to Iraq to carry out a jihad against the occupying American forces. Ironically more Iraqis (and especially people from Iraqi minorities) died as a result of this policy than actual American soldiers. It seems that the Syrian regime was not too concerned with women's rights when it wanted to use Islamists, though it did not hesitate in discarding them just as quickly when they were no longer useful. When we are being frightened off by the Islamic bogeyman, we are being frightened from the Islamic extremism that is itself a product of regimes like those in Syria, and it is misleading to equate such groups with the politically Islamic groups that will now be forced to answer to a people that have not hesitated to topple far more brutal dictators. Far from being a reasonable precaution, using the Islamic bogeyman appears more useful for terrifying people into accepting the status quo of a dictator.

7. We are told that these "changes" that Camille warns against have come at the cost of enormous human casualties. For some very curious reason, he thinks that the Lebanese civil war is relevant to the Arab spring (it is not) and then ignores the role of Syria and Iran in Iraq, or the incompetence of Sudan's regime, in the grotesque orgy of violence that those countries had to endure. In Libya, Gaddafi's men were using anti-aircraft weapons to disperse crowds that had begun their protests peacefully, and the magical figure of 50,000 dead has now been conveniently used by those who lament the fall of Gaddafi and ignore the fact that if he was in the least bit concerned about the welfare of his country, and if he had allowed effective government institutions to be formed in his forty year long rule, then he should have resigned like any self-respecting ruler who has failed in his task. Instead, we are to blame the victim because a dictator did not step down and instead led his country into civil war.

8. We are told that change without a strong central authority leads to chaos and loss of instability. If this is supposed to be an argument against change then it fails. The strongly autocratic regimes that exist in the Arab world are so by design and not coincidence. Saddam Hussein threatened to turn Iraq into dust if he was to leave power, and so did Gaddafi. In an interview with the New York Times, Rami Makhouf, Assad's cousin, said:

“We will sit here. We call it a fight until the end.” He added later, “They should know when we suffer, we will not suffer alone.”

If such an attitude by the very people that are supposed to care for the welfare of the country is not a good enough reason for change, then I do not know what is.

9. We are told that revolutions and civil wars will devastate the economy. That is true, but so will dictatorship and untrammelled power over half a century by powerful dictators and their corrupt families and supporters. In fact when you have decades of political and economic corruption, then a revolution or civil war will be inevitable. Just ask King Louis the XVI of France.

10. Finally, the oldest bogeyman of all is invoked - Israel. This is curious when we hear statements from Rami Makhlouf saying that:

“If there is no stability here, there’s no way there will be stability in Israel,”  

This, again, is the Syrian president's cousin and one of the richest men in Syria. Riad Seif, a Syrian member of Parliament, was arrested after he questioned the monopoly on mobile phone networks that was being cornered by Makhlouf and his family. At the start of the Syrian revolution, analysts questioned whether Makhlouf was being offered as a sacrificial goat to deflect from public anger at the political and economic corruption of the Assad regime. For the regime to distance itself from Makhlouf's comments to the New York Times does not fit with how closely associated this man is to the regime and its interests.

At the end of these ten points we are given a chart with information that is unsourced, and appears to be compiled from information that is not verifiable. A blurb in a red box presents the erroneous assumptions listed above as fact, and proof that most Syrians believe removing Assad is a bad idea. The author then proceeds to rubbish and character assassinate the Syrian opposition figures, and selectively lists sources which do so. Conveniently ignored is the glaring problem that the reliance on such technology is precisely because the Assad regime prevents dissent, brutalises political dissidents, and attempts to crush any sign of dissent with Assad's rule. The fact that the Assad family has been in power for forty years, and still finds freedom of information, assembly and basic communications technology as a threat to be banned and censored, shows how dismally they have failed in their responsibility to the Syrian people. It begs the question of whether they should be given the benefit of the doubt and allowed time for more "reforms".

To conclude, the piece on Creative Syria does not tell us on what basis "many" Syrians are wary of change - any more than the opposition tells us that most Syrians are against Assad's rule. It also gives ten flimsy, and quite sophistic arguments as to why Syrians are allegedly not interested in the revolution. If Camille intended to make the case for why negotiation and peaceful discussion should be the way forward in this impasse, then, sadly, he has failed dismally.
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A Response to Creative Syria's Author on, "The Real Bashar al Assad"

Creative Syria's Camille Otrakji tries once again to convince people that Assad's not such a bad guy. I can often distinguish Camille's articles for his love of making up statistics and then drowning his readers in the detail; and who can ever forget how he - with a straight face - tried to cite Facebook polls as an indicator of the level of support that Assad enjoys. I have pointed out the discrepancies in Otrakji's logic and writings before (click here) but, regardless, I decided to dissect his latest mammoth post, "The Real Bashar al Assad", to see if I've just misunderstood our beloved dictator.

Firstly, however, Otrakji tries to remind people that Assad was once popular amongst Syrians. He tells us that Syria was not a bad place for women, that Assad was at the top of online polls for BBC Arabic, and that even abroad Assad was far more popular than Turkey's Erdogan. That is all well and good, but it seems Otrakji is incapable of understanding that a dictator whose regime has killed over nine thousand Syrian people since protests against his rule began cannot hope to remain as popular as he was beforehand.

About Corruption

Regardless, the first issue Otrakji tries to address is corruption, and again he makes the rather disingenuous statement that Syria is less corrupt than its neighbours Lebanon and Iraq. Yet the statistics he links to hardly inspire any confidence. According to the Corruptions Perceptions Index, Syria ranked only 0.1 points above Lebanon in 2011, and was equally abysmal in its corruption score with Lebanon  in 2010 at an atrocious 2.5 points. I'm not sure what point Camille is trying to make here, but even if we contrast Syria with the rock bottom scores of Iraq, then it hardly makes a difference. It is as if we are being told to cheer up because Zimbabwe is slightly better than Somalia; or that the British National Health Service, in comparison with the health service in Romania, is far better so we should stop complaining. The index that Otrakji quotes is an indictment of Assad's rule.

Next we are told that Assad isn't really that rich, and that his cousin Rami Makhlouf, just happened to make the best of the information he got from contacts in governments to enrich himself:

Makhlouf surely benefited from favourable treatment and insider information as he was awarded a license for Syria’s first cell phone company. He was also able to purchase lands that he apparently knew, through his government contacts, will appreciate in price in the near future. His real fortune is estimated at $2 billion to $4 billion, part of which he made through legitimate, non-corrupt, means including many investments outside Syria.

Perhaps, seeing how intimate he is with the financial affairs of Syria's ruling families, Mr Otrakji could tell us where the Assad's and Makhlouf's were in 1960? And how it is that Mr Makhlouf made his "real fortune" of two billion dollars in the first place? Incredibly, Otrakji contrasts how rich the Makhlouf's became with Lebanon's Hariri, as if the protesters in Syria really care about how rich Hariri is, and are protesting because of the corruption in Lebanon and not in Syria. He then gives us a smokescreen of statistics from the World Bank about how Syria's mortality rate and literacy rates are better under Assad's rule, but this has nothing to do with corruption, and I don't know why he put it under this section as he has not even contrasted this with other countries in the region. Is it not possible for a dictator to be corrupt and still afford his people good educational or health services? Interestingly, he follows this little non sequitur with a paragraph about Syria's oil industry.

This is an interesting paragraph, for Otrakji says:

Allegations that Syria’s income from oil exports used to be pocketed by the President, or his family, are false. They were mostly used to pay for food and energy subsidies. This was confirmed in private to a friend by Syria’s former chief economist Abdullah Aldardari. Both entries (income and expense) appeared for the first time in this year’s budget which explains why the budget is much larger than previous years.

It does not strike Otrakji as odd, and he does not point out to his readers, the strangeness that only now, after forty years of Assad rule, is the income and expense of oil exports included in the budget. What a coincidence! And we are supposed to accept, at face value, the statement of a friend of the former chief economist of the country. An assertion that Assad was using that revenue for food and energy subsidies. This beggars belief, and makes me wonder whether Otrakji takes his readers for fools.

Throughout the section in which Otrakji speaks about corruption in Syria, he extensively cites resources for information that is irrelevant. He speaks about the rumours surrounding those around Assad, he mentions superfluous information about education and mortality, and he speaks of the corruption of other Arab potentates or neighbouring countries, and yet when it comes to Assad himself, he says hardly anything at all apart from repeating hearsay or making general conclusions. So far in the article, the real Bashar remains elusive.

In the next section, Otrakji next lays the blame on the President's appointments:

Over the past 11 years the President mostly failed to meet his people’s expectations as he kept appointing Prime Ministers, Ministers, governors and senior officials that were too often corrupt, inefficient, unqualified and, in general, guaranteed to be undistinguished in any way.

The only thing this section tells us is that the Syrian president is incompetent and unable to hire the right people for the job. But perhaps the most baffling thing about Otrakji's article is what he says next.

Continuing on with the theme of corruption, Otrakji makes a bizarre - and I think desperate - attempt to portray Assad as some kind of champion to his people. He posts links which portray how delighted Israel is that the Assad regime is being threatened - ostensibly to portray that the Syrian revolution is some kind of foreign plot - and then says a few very interesting things:

While the coalition opposed to Assad successfully appeared to champion more individual freedom and dignity, Assad’s supporters’ reaction was: “great, but never at the expense of our national freedom and dignity”. This is a key element that western media fail to understand about the psychology of the Syrian people. Many Syrians are more preoccupied with protecting their country’s national interests rather than their own right to challenge President Assad at the 2014 Presidential elections. 

Otrakji speaks about the "psychology" of the Syrian people with a confidence that can only be misplaced. He then refers to "many" Syrians and again confidently refers to them without citing sources, perhaps he is referring to his Facebook polls? Who knows? He goes on to say:

To many Syrians, including but not limited to Assad’s supporters, “The international community” + the GCC are seen as vultures and sharks. The two Assads, unlike the Qatar financed Syrian opposition, have always been willing to suffer constant pressure, punishment and isolation, to protect Syria’s dignity and independence. If you don’t understand this, you are severely biased.

 So there you have it. He presents you with irrelevant facts and figures and then - defying logic -  presents you with his conclusion and nothing to back it up, and you either accept it or you are severely biased. This is hardly a basis for any kind of discussion the author would expect with people who are highly critical of Assad, and for all the reasons not mentioned in this article.

Handling the Crisis

 This is a fairly vague part of Otrakji's piece. He basically states that either the high death toll in Syria is  everybody's fault or somebody else's fault. I thought he was going to speak about Assad's handling of the crisis, but instead, and rather incredibly, he begins to speak about Burhan Ghalioun, as if the latter is directing the revolution or also ruling the country in tandem through some official position. He then - quite incredibly - seems to dismiss the Syrian revolution as almost entirely an armed conflict, discounting the brutality and murder that Assad's regime has inflicted on unarmed civilians and protesters, the arbitrary arrests, and the widespread torture. At no point does he speak about Assad's handling of the crisis. Again, fifteen minutes of my life wasted on reading something that has nothing to do with what I was lead to believe it was about.

Facebook Polls - Yes...Otrakji refers to Facebook polls. I don't think I need to say anything more.

Counting Pro- and Anti- Assad crowds

In this bit Otrakji uses a U2 concert to contrast - I kid you not - the number of people in pro- and anti- regime protests. What point is being made exactly here? That Assad has equal levels of support and opposition? How does that justify the outrageous brutality inflicted by Assad's state? Otrakji concludes by saying that:

Both assumptions proved to be wrong. There is enough support, opposition, and indifference to make all potential outcomes of the crisis possible. Assad has a tough challenge ahead to lead Syria through the reforms process, but it would be a mistake to assume he is bound to fail.

 Yet a startling omission is made here. Why is there a disproportionate level of violence surrounding anti-Assad demonstrations, and why, if Otrakji is so confident about Assad's level of support, is there not a free and transparent process for elections or referendums allowed? And ones without the threat of violence and intimidation for anybody?

Finally, and based on arbitrary assumptions and guesses, Otrakji presents us with a graph, as if this will give some legitimacy to this shoddily written and badly structured piece. There is nothing about Assad here that is of any value, only dodgy percentages, assumptions and hearsay, sprinkled with a few selective - and often times irrelevant - quotes. As far as I can deduce, Otrakji has dedicated the better (or worst) part of this article deriding those who oppose Assad, or deflecting criticisms of the man, but without offering anything substantial. He certainly hasn't given us any insight into the, "Real Bashar al Assad". Disappointing. .

"This is Landis, Signing Out...For Now..."

There is a real mud-fight taking place in Syriacomment and in which I don't intend to participate. It seems that Joshua Landis is handing over the day-to-day administration of the site to a person called Ehsani and to Camille Otrakji. I've read Ehsani's articles before and he is a sobre and mature analyst of Syrian economic issues as far as I can tell, but unfortunately I cannot say the same for Otrakji. One reader there, Qunfuz, called him a member of the intellectual-Shabeeha, and the label is, sadly, quite true. I've lost a lot of respect for this man [Otrakji] since the start of the Syrian revolution, and I don't think he has any credibility as a moderator for Syria Comment, let alone the fact that the site itself, through Landis, is quite biased towards the Syrian regime's narrative. His position playing the 'Devil's advocate' for the Syrian regime is quite revolting, even for somebody like myself, and I can't say I have much sympathy for him when he is mauled viciously by his critics. Live by the sword and all that...

Hopefully we'll be seeing less of Landis' selective quoting from 'credible sources' and American housewives in Latakia who might have seen somebody that looked like a salafist hanging up laundry on the neighbour's roof. The battle for hearts and minds continues...

[End of Maysaloon Commentary]

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